Gendercide—to borrow the title of a 1985 book by Mary Anne Warren—is often seen as an unintended consequence of China's one-child policy, or as a product of poverty or ignorance. The surplus of bachelors—called in China , or “bare branches”— seems to have accelerated between 19, in ways not obviously linked to the one-child policy, which was introduced in 1979.
And, as is becoming clear, the war against baby girls is not confined to China.
That order has changed fundamentally in the past 25 years.
‘That's a living child,' I said in a shaking voice, pointing at the slops pail. Girl babies don't count.'” In January 2010 the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) showed what can happen to a country when girl babies don't count.
Within ten years, the academy said, one in five young men would be unable to find a bride because of the dearth of young women—a figure unprecedented in a country at peace.
The real cause, argues Nick Eberstadt, a demographer at the American Enterprise Institute, a think-tank in Washington, DC, is not any country's particular policy but “the fateful collision between overweening son preference, the use of rapidly spreading prenatal sex-determination technology and declining fertility.” These are global trends.
And the selective destruction of baby girls is global, too.
For the generation born in 2000-04, it was 124 (ie, 124 boys were born in those years for every 100 girls).
According to CASS the ratio today is 123 boys per 100 girls.The number is based on the sexual discrepancy among people aged 19 and below.According to CASS, China in 2020 will have 30m-40m more men of this age than young women.Parts of India have sex ratios as skewed as anything in its northern neighbour.Other East Asian countries—South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan—have peculiarly high numbers of male births.‘Don't move, you can't save it, it's too late.' “‘But that's...murder..you're the police! The policemen held on to me for a few more minutes.